

The Quest for Good Governance in Nigeria: A Reflection

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Abstract

Nigeria's governance and development experience since independent remains a paradox that continues to defy conventional wisdom. In the midst of fabulous oil wealth, mass poverty, economic stagnation, endemic corruption, political instability, weak public institutions, insecurity, and social conflict are common features that have characterised the Nigerian state. The focus of this paper therefore, is on the challenges of governance in Nigeria. The elite's theory was used as the theoretical framework of this paper. This paper also employs a content analysis in exploring the trajectory of development and governance in Nigeria and concludes that there is need to correctly evaluate our past, boldly asses the present, so that we can make useful contributions to the glorious tomorrow for generations yet unborn. It recommends among others; the need for the political leadership and the ruling elites to imbibe and practice the core values of good governance and democracy in Nigeria and also the need for the citizens to become active participant in the governance process in Nigeria.

Keywords: Governance, Elite Theory, Democracy, Leadership, Poverty

Introduction

Nigeria is a conundrum because, despite its wealth, the vast majority of its people have remained impoverished since the country's independence. The country is ranked among the 141 poorest countries in the world by the UNDP's human development index. According to their assessment, Nigeria is ranked among the 20th poorest nations in the world, with 54.4% of the population living in absolute poverty and 70% of the population being classed as poor (Ugoh and Ukpere, 2009:849). In a similar vein, 90.8 percent of Nigerians live on less than \$2 a day, while 70.2 percent make less than \$1. Since up to 95% of this enormous wealth is controlled by the few, Nigeria's state poverty is frequently made worse by the growing gap between the rich and the poor. as up to 95 percent of this great wealth is controlled by about .01 percent of the population.

The fact that the richest 20 percent of the population receive 55.7 percent of the total income while the poorest 20 percent earn 4.4 percent has been made abundantly evident by Oshewolo (2010:267). The nation has not been very effective in utilizing its resources for sustainable development and the common good, despite this potential. Even though Nigeria makes significantly more money than several of these nations combined, it was ranked 142nd in the Human Development Index (HDI) 2012 report, below Mauritania, Congo, Cameroon, Togo, Kenya, Ghana, and, of course, South Africa and all of the North African nations. However, a \$2 trillion economy and more than \$500 billion in oil revenues were primarily stolen or mishandled. And this is directly related to the nation's leadership and governance shortcomings over the years. Political leaders in Nigeria have consistently been held accountable for poor administration and underwhelming sustainable development since the country's restoration to democracy in 1999. Unsurprisingly, those in public service, especially politicians, have faced numerous charges of contributing to Nigeria's poor administration. As a result, the supply of public goods to the public, accountability, the rule of law, and transparency in government are all negatively impacted, which serves as the background for this study.

Thus, the analytical goal of this article was to examine Nigeria's governance controversy and mess. After nearly 65 years of political independence and more than 25 years of uninterrupted

democratic experience, it will primarily examine Nigeria's crisis governance in spite of the country's wealth of human and material resources.

Theoretical Framework

This essay embraces the elite theory made popular by Robert Michels (1876-1936), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941). Usman and Avidime (2016) assert that the elite theory provides a concise explanation of the social relationships and power dynamics pertaining to the appropriation and maintenance of state authority in a democratic setting. "People who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially" are considered elites, according to Higley (2009: 3).

Furthermore, the elite theory exposes one of the core characteristics and realities of representative democracy: the division of society into a weak majority controlled by the elites and a powerful minority that controls and manipulates the levers of state power. Even though elites are generally seen as having the organizational skills and political acumen necessary to guide political statecraft from a democratic standpoint (Omodia, 2011), elitism contradicts the fundamental democratic tenet of mass ownership of the governance process. However, there is disagreement over whether the general public has the knowledge, beliefs, and abilities required for democratic political leadership. Furthermore, the eclectic nature of elites—which is demonstrated by their various social, economic, professional, traditional, bureaucratic, and political divisions—tends to erode the cohesive status associated with elites, even though the classical theory of elitism appears to assume that elites are a homogenous group.

The differences always highlight the inconsistencies and somewhat opposing and competing beliefs, interests, aspirations, and orientations between the political elites and elites on the one hand (Omodia, 2011). The dominant emphasis on controlling political and governmental authority to safeguard and advance members' interests at the expense of the general populace is predominantly highlighted by the manipulative and self-centered characteristics of elites. To maintain their political dominance and hegemony, elites in Nigeria are known to manipulate the populace through a variety of means, including the continuation of political violence, ethnification of electoral politics, political corruption, appropriation of the public policy process, and deinstitutionalization of governance institutions (Okoh, 2010; Omodia, 2011).

However, these Nigerian elites' methods are not only impolitic and uncultured, but they also fundamentally differ from those of elites in developed democracies that cater to the interests of the masses through party politics and free and fair elections (Omodia, 2011). The elite theory provides a thorough explanation of why the state has failed to improve the socioeconomic and political circumstances of its citizens since May 29, 1999, when democratic governance was restored. Godfatherism and violent expressions within and between parties during the fourth republic are examples of elite power struggles that are harmful (Omodia and Aliu, 2013). Furthermore, in order to further their own agendas, the ruling elites have taken over the public nature of the policy-making process.

It's interesting to note that although the political leaders of the fourth republic have been able to create and execute policies that give them enormous sums of money in retirement pensions and allowances, the majority of these leaders struggle to pay workers the pitiful minimum wage each month and to give pensioners their meager pensions (Usman and Avidime, 2016).

The Concept of Governance

According to World Bank (1989:50) governance as "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs". It encompasses the state's institutional and structural arrangements, decision making process and implementation capacity and the relationship between government officials

and the public. It implies that public authorities play an indispensable and potentially creative role in establishing the economic environment and in determining the distribution of assets and benefits. Conversely, it also implies the possibility that the government may be “captured” by a self-seeking elite intent on plundering the nation’s wealth. From time immemorial, societies have struggled to establish governments that promote public interest, only to find that public resources have been diverted to private benefits and that power is being retained by violent and arbitrary means.

The World Bank’s definition is considered neutral because it recognizes the possibility of bad government and does not equate governance with democracy, although the elements of good governance such as transparency, accountability and the rule of law are vital for the democratization of the society. The neutral approach to the definition of governance carries at least two advantages. One advantage is that it accommodates the reality that the empirical evidence on the links among governance regime type and development is mixed and inconclusive. The other advantage of the neutral definition is that it yields two distinct, even if interrelated, dimensions of governance, the political and technical. The political dimension is concerned with the commitment to good governance while the technical dimension relates to issues of efficiency and capacity for public management. The significance of good governance lies in the capacity to enhance the potential in both democratic and authoritarian regimes for good economic policy and good economic performance (Otaha, 2009).

For democracy to thrive, the World Bank elaborates on four elements of good governance (World Bank, 1992):

- Public sector management emphasizing the need for effective financial and human resource management through improved budgeting, accounting and reporting, and rooting out inefficiency particularly in public enterprises;
- Accountability in public services, including effective accounting, auditing and decentralization, and generally making public officials responsible for their actions and responsive to consumers;
- A predictable legal framework with rules known in advance; a reliable and independent judiciary and law enforcement mechanisms; and
- Availability of information and transparency in order to enhance policy analysis, promote public debate and reduce the risk of corruption.

From the above conception of ‘good governance’, it’s apparent that for a government to be democratic and for governance to be qualified as good, the repositories of power and managers of resources must be accountable to the governed, responsive to the demands of the people and be guided by the principle of rule of law. Good governance is therefore imperative for a durable and viable democratic polity like Nigeria. Even the level of corruption indicates the level of good or bad governance in a society. Precisely because it diverts public funds to private pockets and has been responsible for virtually all military coups in Nigeria. The absence of good governance in Nigeria is no doubt responsible for the abysmal level of poverty expressed in Nigeria. This is because Nigerian leaders have not been able to deliver to the people the dividends of democracy. Thus, over twenty years of our sojourn in the path of democracy have been watered by blood, littered by wanton destruction, disregard for the rule of law, low level of legitimacy and highly demonstrable lack of accountability and corruption. This calls for the need to correctly evaluate our past, boldly assess the present, so that we can make useful contributions to the glorious tomorrow for generations yet unborn.

Thus, Deakaa (2006), opines that good governance could thrive when the leadership spares no efforts in tackling corruption and inefficiency and enhancing accountability in government. This

according to her, will also mean a drastic reduction in the scope distortionary rent-seeking activities; eliminating wasteful or unproductive uses of public funds and indeed the provision of desired domestic security within the polity. Bakare (2012) posits that a comparison of Nigeria's democratic practices with those of other African nations raises questions about whether Nigerian democracy is a civilian administration with a military bent. According to Abraham Lincoln's conception of democracy, a real democracy ought to encourage accountability and receptivity within a community. It is sufficient to say that good governance is reflected in accountability. However, any democratic environment that lacks responsive governance is really a dictatorship masquerading as a civilian one. Unfortunately, this is the state of Nigerian democracy. In the Nigerian democratic context, the opinions of the people are never taken into account. In a democratic context, the electorate is thought to hold the power of sovereignty, but in Nigeria, the opposite is true. Even though the public complains about government policy, they are intended to be completely disregarded. Conversely, any elected official who appears to be giving out any "dividends" of democracy is widely applauded, as though they are using their own funds for the alleged altruistic gesture.

Politicians would only make such a promise to the people in Nigeria as part of their agenda. When it comes to good government, accountability is the last thing that most Nigerian politicians would ever consider essential. It is very regrettable that the freedom of speech is limited to what can be expressed. It is true that folks are free to voice their complaints. However, the administration has never crept a step in response to the people's complaints. When citizens go the further step to voice their complaints in a large-scale demonstration, the government uses military force to harass and threaten them.

In actuality, it is a civilian administration with a military mindset, even though it has on paper. In the corridors of power, desperate politicians have increasingly politicized and penetrated the judiciary, which appears to be the last chance of the impoverished. According to Lawal (2007), leadership has thus turned into a window of opportunity to accumulate money and drain the public coffers at the expense of the impoverished masses.

It is also regrettable that the typical Nigerian is unaware of the need of effective government. An average Nigerian's psyche is becoming more and more imprinted with a substandard mentality as a result of the years of suffering amid plenty. Therefore, even though he uses public monies, every incumbent political office holder who gives away some "goodies" to the public in the name of democratic dividends is viewed as a saviour. This does not change the reality that excellent deeds are worthy of praise and encouragement. However, there is an issue with the voters' perception of what good government is all about when someone is receiving a lot of praise and recognition for carrying out the duties for which he was elected.

The welfare of the people is the goal of good government, but in the democratic setting of Nigeria, the opposite is true, with good governance serving the interests of politicians at the expense of the average citizen. Therefore, it raises major concerns that until Nigerians start holding their leaders accountable, civilian governments with military mindsets would keep impoverishing the populace in the name of transformation. The individuals in positions of authority will keep draining the country's coffers in the name of economic reform until Nigerians realize that sovereignty is within their grasp.

A true democracy is about the people, not the government. The people who are ruled are the focus of good government, not the rulers. The standard for a strong economy and successful governance is the well-being of the general populace (Bakare, 2012).

Interrogating the Trajectory of Governance in Nigeria

For a very long time, the Nigerian people have longed for the country to adopt democratic rule. Following many years of military rule, the people, organized civil society alliance, and labor

unions struggled tenaciously for the establishment of democratic governance. Therefore, it is evident that we have not yet achieved effective administration after twenty-five years of unbroken democratic experience. Without a doubt, the Nigerian people are not only dissatisfied but also disappointed and disillusioned with our political leadership's failure to provide effective government.

Like most African countries, Nigeria has been embroiled in a crisis of governance on a mammoth scale. Kayode *et al* (1994:46) list the problems as including, the conduct of governance within an ethnic framework, personalization of leadership and irresponsible use of power which is at variance with the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, crass opportunism of a political class sacrificing national economic development objective for selfish material gains, weak, shallow and badly run institutions and total neglect of social welfare, sacrifice of merits on the altar of ethnic exigency – the so called federal character, corruption and the pursuit of personal wealth at the expense of the common good, all these are antithetical to the achievement of equitable growth and development and are prime factors responsible for Nigeria's present development crisis (Otaha, 2009).

Nigeria, like the majority of African nations, has been enmeshed in a government of lea issue. Nigeria has seen relatively little instances of good government. Nigeria has experimented with a number of political systems, including the American presidential system and the British parliamentary model. Throughout its nearly 65 years of independence, the military form of government has predominated. However, none of these models have been able to address the national question or the governance crisis in Nigeria. Probity, honesty, adherence to the rule of law, and democratic involvement are essential components of government, regardless of the perspective from which we view it (Orubu 2001:61).

What them are some of the key crises of governance inhibiting the enthronement of a virile governance ethos in Nigeria over the years?

Emergence of Militant Sub-Nationalist Agitations and the Crisis of Legitimacy

Nigeria's 1999 return to democracy, following years of military rule, and the acceleration of poverty brought on by the introduction of structural adjustment measures in the early 1980s offered a chance to test the long-held theory that "democracy does not thrive well in a poverty ridden environment" in Nigeria. The strong expectations that greeted Nigeria's return to democracy were short-lived, as the government's growing incapacity to deliver on the benefits of democracy eroded the high hopes that the country's rising poverty would be reversed or corrected by the new "democratic government" led by then-President Olusegun Obasanjo. The first obvious obstacle this posed to the new democracy was the growing legitimacy dilemma facing the new administration. As a result, the citizens were able to publicly question the legitimacy of the Nigerian state and the power of the ruling class. They were also able to voice their ethnic demands that had been suppressed for years by the oppressive military regime (Metumara, 2010:92).

The expanding number of vigilante groups throughout the nation, are essentially taking over the roles of the police and the courts due to the crisis of legitimacy engulfing the Nigerian state and the growing lack of trust in the state's institutions, particularly the police and the judiciary. The Nigerian state has become extremely unruly due to the growing use of self-help and other unofficial conflict resolution techniques brought on by the decline in trust in state institutions. These inclinations have impeded industry and foreign investment, hampered socioeconomic progress, and threatened the consolidation of democracy.

Identity and Ethno-Religious Conflicts

Nigerian politics have been dominated by ethnic tensions and bloodshed since the Fourth Republic was established in 1999. Competition between and within groups for the expensive

state resources and authority made the "forces of identity, particularly ethnicity and religion, became appealing" (Omotola, 2008a:59). Violence has frequently broken out as a result, killing numerous people and destroying property valued at millions of Naira (Nigerian money).

These conflicts include the Sagamu crisis in 1999, the Ife-Modakeke war in 2000, the communal conflict over the location of the Local Government Headquarter in Agyaragu in 2000, the Tiv-Jukun crisis in 2001, the ethnic violence between the Tiv and Azara people in Nasarawa State, the ongoing bloodbath between Hausa-Fulani settlers and indigenous people in Plateau State, and the religious crisis that occurred in Yelwaq, Bauchi State, on May 4, 2004. In the northern states, this pattern of violence has become a permanent occurrence (Ifeanacho and Nwagwu, 2009:12) and the farmer-header crisis across most states of the nation.

Because of the relative poverty of the Nigerian elite, which makes them reliant on the government and foreign capital for accumulation, ethno-religious violence has continued to be a major obstacle to the country's democratic experiment (Obi, 2001:14). In order to maintain their hold on power, they frequently foment conflict by taking advantage of polarizing factors like religion and ethnicity.

Social Injustice and Political Apathy

Nigeria's high level of governance deficit has also contributed to a high degree of inequality, social injustice, and ensuing political indifference. The National Bureau of Statistics (2007:38) notes that the number of Nigerians living in poverty rose from 39.07 million in 1992 to 70 million in 2004; the UNDP estimates that approximately 83.9% of Nigerians live on less than \$2 USD per day (Nna & Igwe, 2010: 133). Oshewolo (2010:267) pointed out that 70.2 percent of Nigerians live on less than \$1 per day, while 90.8 percent live on less than \$2 per day, highlighting the high level of political apathy among significant segments of the population and supporting the claim that poverty reduces both participation in democratic life and popular support for democracy. The implications of limited participation in democracy remove such a system from the realm of true democracy and prevent it from engineering people's center development as well as the loss of its essence and meaning.

Such a democratic system is equally susceptible to reverting to authoritarianism and dictatorship. Not to mention the various ramifications of violence and wars that have been relevant in Nigeria since 1999. Furthermore, Nigeria's widespread poverty has led to political indifference, which has impeded and exacerbated the formation of dynamic civil societies, as well as the development of civic culture and democratic values.

Corruption and Institutional Failures

The fourth republic's extreme corruption poses a serious threat to democratic administration. Understanding the prebendal nature and character of Nigerian politics is essential to comprehending the corruption issue in the fourth republic. Politics is typically viewed by Nigerian politicians as a way to seize state power, gain access to, and amass state resources for their own personal gain rather than as a way to provide public service. As stated by Aliu (2013), "the overwhelming allegations against and in some instances conviction of political leaders and legislators in the Nigerian fourth republic of bribery, nepotism, cronyism, award of phony contracts, inflation of contract sums, embezzlement, electoral fraud, and abuse of office are indicative of the ruling elites' consideration of politics as the means to capture state power and offices for economic benefits."

High levels of disrespect for constitutionalism, egregious violations of people's rights, and the rule by law, not of law, are the results of institutional weakness and failure (Omotola, 2008b:53). It should be mentioned that a number of violent confrontations and ethno-religious intolerance have

also increased as a result of institutional failure. Allen contends that "it is this weak state that produces politics that makes violence a prime means of political action in Nigeria" (Metumara, 2010:99), clearly acknowledging this fact. Since 1999, the escalating rate of violence has been unabated by these feeble state institutions.

Crime, Electoral Violence and Insecurity

In what Olorode (2006:4) referred to as the crisis of poverty and social instability brought on by the Structural Adjustment Programs (now renamed "economic reforms"), the Nigerian government has retreated from "economy and welfare" provisions since the return to democracy in 1999. These provisions "further reduce the limited resources that could be used to address the growing social crises in a context where there are no safety nets" (Obi, 2004:12). This led to what Ojakorotu (2009:163) refers to as personal economic situations, which were extremely detrimental to citizens and included high unemployment, food shortages, public safety issues, clean water shortages, poor health care, low-income levels, and more. The social and economic progress that democracy promised has been elusive, even as their material circumstances have deteriorated (Ojakorotu, 2009:171). This has caused a great deal of annoyance because true democracy encompasses more than just elections; it also involves improving the material circumstances and expectations of the populace (Jozana, 1999:1). As a result, "social misery, violence, and crime" escalated. Obi (2004) states that "the political class re-arms its war chest for the next elections." Nigeria has thus developed a culture of gun ownership and impunity since 1999, especially among the youth (Ginifer and Ismail, 2005:2). To "contain mounting social unrest and escalating conflicts," the state has frequently responded with counterviolence (Obi, 2004:12). Particularly noteworthy is the threat that electoral violence poses to Nigeria's democratic progress. According to Omotola (2008a:61), "Africa's 'new' democracies have been seriously violated in many ways." He argued that "the deepening crisis of electoral governance, partly reflected in the phenomenon of electoral violence," is "one outstanding area" of this breach. According to Dahl, "Africa's bold democratic aspirations are often marred by electoral fraud and other irregularities that deny citizens the right to choose and control their leaders" (Oko, 2008:16), electoral violence frequently results from electoral fraud and defective electoral processes. In addition to weakening "public trust and support for the government," these have frequently led to widespread bloodshed in Nigeria.

Nigerian elections have been poorly managed and run, according to Ojakorotu (2009:181). Violence, brigandage, and rigging are all readily recognized aspects of the electoral process. Nigeria has a high rate of electoral violence because the country's elections are treated like fiercely contested zero-sum games (Olarinmoye, 2008:67). Election violence has recently taken on structural, psychological, and physical forms, all of which aim to sway the outcome of the election in favor of the violent offenders (Omotola, 2008:61). The failure of the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) to hold free and fair elections since the start of civil rule in 1999 represents a significant setback to democratic governance in the Nigerian fourth republic, and the cost of governance in Nigeria is enormous. All of this has been documented in the most recent elections held between 1999 and 2023.

Be that as it may, the critical aspects of good governance according to Otaha, (2009) which can help to improve the economic performance of a typical developing African market economies in general and Nigeria in particular and assist in maximizing the benefits of globalization include among other things;

- i. Deliberate effort by the state to create virile and credible institutions.
- ii. The formation and implementation of politics that enhance the ability of the private sector to have access to financial resources, both domestic and foreign.

- iii. The willingness and ability of the state to effectively combat corruption in both the private and public sectors of the economy in order to reduce net social losses due to rent-seeking behaviour of the economic, social and political agents.
- iv. The willingness of government to continue to invest in infrastructures particularly in the area of power, roads, and communication systems, in order to reduce the cost of doing business, thereby enhancing competitiveness and adoption of other policies that promote education and the development of technology.
- v. The acceptance of agriculture and industrial development as core concerns of economic policy, in order to create incentives towards a transformation of the existing productive system.
- vi. The development of policies that improve human capacities, particularly in organizations that represent the interest of the country in international bodies.
- vii. The strong political will to develop and sustain a credible legal and judicial system.
- viii. The adoption of a political system of democratic principles that guarantee individual freedom and policies that enhance sustainable human development and
- ix. A relatively independent Central bank and credible financial system.

In essence, good governance deals with how those who have the authority of the state make efforts to achieve the goals or the ends of the state –the maintenance of law and order, the provision of welfare for its citizens and the pursuit of national interest. In the global arena, it refers to the process and quality of governance and the role of the civil society and the private sector. Western democracy insists that good governance entails institutions and values. Also, socialist democracy sought to prove that a critical element of democracy is mass, popular participation and notions of equity in the distribution of societal resources (Jega, 2007). Good governance depicts an ideal situation where the citizens enjoy their complete fundamental human rights as enshrined in the constitution. Conversely, this cannot be forthcoming if the principles, values, and norms of mass participation, transparency, open-door policies, equity and the supremacy of the law are not guide as well as the delivery of public services.

Conclusion

There is no gainsaying that good governance is imperative for a durable and viable democratic polity like Nigeria. The height of corruption signifies the level of good or bad governance in any nation. In particular, due to diversion of public funds into private coffers, there have been incessant military coups which have gone a long way to politicize the cardinal security organization like Nigerian army and other agencies. The absence of good governance in Nigeria is no doubt responsible for the abysmal level of poverty and underdevelopment experienced in Nigeria. This is because Nigerian leaders have not been able to deliver to the people the dividends of democracy as promised during electioneering campaigns. Thus, over seventeen years of the nation's sojourn in the path of democracy have witnessed blood-bath, wanton destruction, disregard for the rule of law, low level of legitimacy and highly demonstrable lack of accountability and corruption resulting in bad governance in over fifty-eight years of independence.

From the foregoing, it is apparent to conclude that for a responsive leadership and government to be democratic, and for governance to be qualified as good, the repositories of power and managers of resources must be; selfless, accountable to the governed, extol institutions above personality, responsive to the demands of the people; and guided by the principles of rule of law. The issue of governance must centre on the political, economic and even the corporate dimensions. So, any effort to enthronize good governance in the process of economic management in the country must focus more on these three dimensions. In essence, there can be no meaningful development in Nigeria and other Africa countries amidst of this high rate of leadership rascality,

unresponsiveness and irresponsibility. By and large, effective and strong political leadership is the mother of good governance.

5.3. Recommendations

The following recommendations are made;

- i) There is need for the political leadership and the ruling elites to imbibe and practice the core values of good governance and democracy in Nigeria.
- ii) There is the need for the citizens to become active participant in the governance process in Nigeria. In search for good governance and development, we need not only good and visionary leaders, but more importantly, good followers.
- iii) Also lack of accountability to the people, the inability of people to access information, widespread corruption, poor governmental policies that cannot tackle poverty effectively, youth unemployment, an abnormally wide gap between the rich and the poor, and greed, all of which have militated against the spirit of promoting the national interest and good governance must be urgently address. People must learn to hold their leaders responsible for their actions and non-actions. They should respect their leaders but they should not worship them. People must cultivate the act of asking their leaders questions, thereby making the leaders to know that they are being watched.
- iv) Deliberate and conscious efforts, borne out of patriotism are needed to ensure the emergence of a virile civil society. An informed civil society is necessary to balance the power of the Nigerian State. This could be a solution for ending the brazen abuse of powers and privileges by public officials and stimulate a psychological reorientation towards meaningful development. A genuine monitoring of government policies and programmes could lead to the detection of corrupt practices. The consequence is the near possibility of alteration in the perception of government as the instrument of the elites to acquire and retain power at the expense of the people.
- v) Our elections should be conducted in a way that is transparent and fair so that people-desired candidates will emerge winners. Election is the foundation of every democracy and governance and if wrongly conducted, there will be no way for good governance and accountability.
- vi) Finally, our leaders should rule with the fear of God knowing fully well that posterity will eventually judge their performance.

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